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Abstract
Most doctors in the NRMP are matched to one of their most-preferred internship pro-
grams. Since various surveys indicate similarities across doctors’ preferences, this suggests
a puzzle. How can nearly everyone get a position in a highly-desirable program when po-
sitions in each program are scarce? We provide one possible explanation for this puzzle.
We show that the patterns observed in the NRMP data may be an artifact of the interview
process that precedes the match. Our analysis highlights the importance of interactions
occurring outside of a matching clearinghouse for resulting outcomes, and casts doubts on
analysis of clearinghouses that take reported preferences at face value.
Key words: NRMP, Deferred acceptance, Interviews, First-rank matches
JEL: C78, D47, J44
*Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, Caltech.
†Caltech.
‡Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh.
§Department of Economics, Princeton University, CEPR, and NBER.
¶Echenique gratefully acknowledges the support of NSF SES-1558757 and CNS-1518941. Yariv
gratefully acknowledges the support of NSF grant SES-1629613.
ar
X
iv
:2
00
2.
05
32
3v
1 
 [e
co
n.G
N]
  1
3 F
eb
 20
20
1 Introduction
The National Resident Matching Program (NRMP; or “The Match”) has matched
millions of doctors to residency programs across the United States. In 2019 alone,
there were over 38,000 active applicants matched to over 35,000 positions. At face
value, match results reported by the NRMP suggest comforting news to newly-
minted doctors: In 2019, 47.1% of applicants were matched to their first-ranked
choice, and 72.5% were matched to one of their three top-ranked choices. The
most-recent year’s figures are by no means an aberration. In fact, the fraction of ap-
plicants matched to their first-ranked choice in 2019 is the lowest it has been over
the past two decades. Our paper offers one explanation for this pattern through
the interview process preceding the match. We show that interactions outside of
a matching clearinghouse may be at least as important as the matching protocol
prescribed by the clearinghouse itself.
Why is the prevalence of doctors’ matches to their top-ranked residencies sur-
prising? The algorithm governing the NRMP match is designed to implement a
stable matching. If residents submit their true preferences to the NRMP clearing-
house, a predominance of matches to top-ranked employers implies that prospec-
tive residents’ preferences are highly negatively correlated—as if pre-sorted. In-
deed, if residents have very similar preferences (for example through a common
ranking of residency positions), with limited positions at each program, only a
handful can conceivably get their top-ranked choice. More specifically, consider a
simple market with a hundred jobs and a hundred doctors. Common preferences
on both sides (a fully assortative market) would yield an outcome where only one
percent of doctors are matched to their top-ranked program. As we will show be-
low, even a relatively small common component in doctors’ preferences yields a
low volume of matches to top-ranked hospitals.
Certainly, one explanation might be that prospective residents’ preferences are
diametrically opposed to one another and only a handful of candidates prefer each
position. This explanation stands in the face of various surveys and preference es-
timations (see Rees-Jones, 2018; Agarwal, 2015). We propose another story. Prior
to the centralized match, prospective residents interview with hospitals around
the nation. The determination of who interviews with whom is decentralized in
nature, resembling the process underlying many academic job markets. There are
two important features of the interview stage. First, hospitals have interview ca-
pacities and consider only a small number of candidates out of the entire pool.
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Second, hospitals, and consequently newly-minted doctors, by and large only sub-
mit rankings to the centralized match for those that they interviewed with.1
For illustration, consider a setting where hospitals and prospective residents’
preferences can be decomposed into two components: common and idiosyncratic.
The common component for prospective residents may reflect public rankings
of hospitals, quality of life in the hospitals’ geographical area, etc. For hospi-
tals, it may reflect doctors’ academic performance and test scores (Agarwal, 2015).
The idiosyncratic component reflects any personal or match-specific preferences—
proximity to family for doctors, particular research interests for hospitals, and so
on. At the interview stage, it is the common component of preferences that gov-
erns the interviews that take place.2 Namely, each hospital has a fixed quota of
interviews and the unique stable matching with respect to everyone’s common
preference component determines who interviews with whom. At the interview
stage, the idiosyncratic components are realized, either through information dis-
covery during the interviews, or through priorities that take greater precedence
once the actual match is considered. At the centralized match stage, the “full”
1The Results of the 2019 NRMP Applicant Survey (available at http://www.nrmp.
org/main-residency-match-data/), reports on the median respondent by four types
(matched/unmatched US senior/independent applicant) in each of 21 specialties (anesthesi-
ology, pediatrics, surgery, etc.). Sixty-three of the 84 medians reported have the number of
interviews attended and programs ranked perfectly coincide, where for 81 the two figures are
±1. For example, the median matched/unmatched US senior (independent applicant) respondent
in emergency medicine applied to 46/56 programs (62/77). This process led to 14/6 interviews
attended (10/3), and a rank-order list of length 14/6 (10/3).
A similar picture emerges in the NRMP’s 2018 Program Director survey of the hospitals (here,
across 23 specialties as it includes thoracic and vascular surgery). Looking at the per position num-
bers and averaging across specialties, we find 104.3 applications for each open position, leading to
14.5 interviews, and then 12.7 ranked candidates. Across all 23 specialties, the number of ranked
candidates is always lower than the number of interviews.
2Returning to the 2018 Program Director survey, across the 1,233 respondents, the four most
frequently cited factors in choosing applicants for interviews are primarily commonly observed
test-scores and letters: (i) USMLE Step 1/COMLEX 1 test scores (94 percent of respondents); (ii)
letters of recommendation (86 percent); (iii) medical student performance evaluations (81 percent);
and (iv) USMLE Step 2/COMLEX Level 2 scores (80 percent). On average, program directors report
that 48 percent of applicants are rejected out-of-hand based on standardized screening procedures,
while 47 percent receive an in-depth review. In contrast, the most frequently cited factors for
ranking applicants after interviews are more idiosyncratic: (i) interactions with faculty during
interview and visit (96 percent); (ii) interpersonal skills (95 percent); (iii) interactions with house
staff during interview and visit (91 percent); and (iv) feedback from current residents (78 percent).
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preferences, accounting for both common and idiosyncratic components, are used
to determine everyone’s submitted rankings. Importantly, only interview partners
are ranked. We refer to these reported preferences as “interview-truncated.”
The truncation induced by the interview process necessarily narrows agents’
original preferences. Furthermore, capacity constraints at the interview stage im-
ply that some prospective residents do not interview with programs they originally
rank very highly. As a result, their matched programs’ stated rank is higher than
they really are.
The presence of a common component in prospective residents’ preferences
is crucial for this conclusion. In fact, we show that interview truncation will not
always lead to a matching with inflated rankings. With sufficient disagreement
in doctors’ preferences, we show that the introduction of interviews may cause
matched partners’ stated rankings to go down, not up. Nonetheless, if all doctors
have a common ranking for hospitals, we show that interviews necessarily lead to
inflated rankings of prospective residents’ matched programs.3
The assumption that all doctors are in perfect agreement over their ranking of
hospitals is, of course, extreme. However, our main theoretical finding illustrates
that in large markets, an arbitrarily weak common component is sufficient for inter-
views to generate the patterns observed in the data. We show that a small common-
value component on both sides’ preferences assures that a large fraction of doctors
is very likely to be matched to programs that are highly ranked in the interview-
truncated preferences, but these matched programs are far lower-ranked in the
underlying preferences over all programs.
While our most-general results are asymptotic, they are also supported by an
array of simulation exercises pertaining to realistic market sizes. These simula-
tions fit well the aggregate statistics reported by the NRMP, the fraction of un-
matched agents, and the distribution of outcomes in the submitted rankings. 4
Our results have important implications for the NRMP, and the matching liter-
ature more broadly. Doctors participating in the deferred-acceptance algorithm
3A related idea is pursued in Beyhaghi and Tardos (2018), who show that interviews may in-
crease the size of a match, not decrease it. Rees-Jones (2018) suggests the scope of doctors misre-
porting.
4Ashlagi, Kanoria, and Leshno (2017) show that imbalanced markets lead to high match ranks
for the short side of the market. In the NRMP, it is the hospitals who are on the short side, at least
on the aggregate. Furthermore, Ashlagi et al. (2017) assume random independent preferences with
no common-value component.
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that underlies the match have incentives to truthfully report their preferences
(Roth and Peranson, 1999). Traditionally, economists view the NRMP as an ideal
case study in strategy-proof design. Our findings suggest that reported prefer-
ences in the NRMP should be interpreted with caution since they are filtered
through an interview stage that pre-sorts the participants. In particular, reported
high-rank matches should not be read literally. More importantly, any conclusions
drawn about welfare using estimated preferences from the match itself are sus-
pect. This message is particularly stark given that our paper ignores the strategic
effects of interviews; we assume that agents’ preferences are known, or reported
truthfully.5 Moving beyond the NRMP, our results highlight the important role
interactions occurring outside of a matching clearinghouse can have on outcomes.
Zooming in on behavior within a clearinghouse may yield misleading conclusions
when done in isolation.
2 Setting Up the Puzzle
The introduction sets out the broad pieces to a puzzle presented by the NRMP
match outcome data. In this section, we briefly outline and discuss why standard
assumptions on preferences and the process are at odds with observed outcomes.
To begin, consider Figure 1. Here we illustrate the fraction of matched NRMP
residents whose final outcome is their top-ranked hospital/program. Conditional
on matching, approximately one half of all applicants get their top-ranked out-
come across each year of the past two decades. This is true both for US seniors
(residents graduating from a MD-granting medical school in the US) and indepen-
dent applicants (those from DO-granting medical schools or based outside of the
US).6
In order to get a sense for the types of preferences that could generate these
patterns, consider a two-sided matching market withN = 100 participants on each
side of the market. Suppose that for each doctor d and each hospital h we draw
5See Beyhaghi, Saban, and Tardos (2017) for an analysis of the strategic implications of inter-
views.
6Across the 23 years reported, the fraction of unmatched US seniors is 5.2 percent, with a range
of 4.2–6.2 percent and no clear trend. In contrast, for independent applicants, on average 45.4
percent go unmatched, where this figure shows a significant downward trend from 57.9 percent
unmatched in 1997 to 31.9 percent in 2019.
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Figure 1: NRMP residents matched to top-ranked program (conditional on
matching)
cardinal match utilities for the doctor, ud(h), and for the hospital, uh(d), as:
ud(h) = λ
D · ch + (1−λD) · ηd,h
uh(d) = λ
H · cd + (1−λH ) · ηh,d ,
where ch and cd are each i.i.d. N (0,1) random variables representing the common
utility components for each hospital and doctor, respectively, while the η terms are
i.i.d. idiosyncratic terms, again distributed as N (0,1) random variables. Simulat-
ing the deferred-acceptance algorithm (DA) on the resultant ordinal rankings, and
repeating the process across 100 simulations, we calculate the fraction of doctors
matched to their top-ranked hospital.
Figure 2 indicates the fraction of doctors matched to their top-ranked program
in the simulations, as we vary the weight hospitals place on the common utility
component λH on the horizontal axis (simulations vary this weight from 0 to 1 in
0.1 increments). Each separate curve indicates a different value for λD , the weight
on the doctors’ common component (λD illustrated from 0 to 1 in 0.2 increments).
The simulation shows that we only achieve 50 percent matched to their top-
ranked program when hospitals’ preferences heavily weight the common compo-
nent (λH close to one) and doctors’ preferences heavily weight the idiosyncratic
component (λD close to zero). While hospitals having a strong common compo-
nent makes sense, and is consistent with NRMP survey figures that place a lot
of weight on common components (test scores, recommendation letters, etc.) the
5
Figure 2: Simulated outcomes
requirement that doctors’ preferences are almost completely idiosyncratic is in
tension with what we know from the process.
First, examining the NRMP’s 2019 post-match survey of residents, while po-
tentially idiosyncratic components are highly cited as determining applications
to and rankings of programs ( “perceived goodness of fit" and “geographic loca-
tion,”), common-value components appear at similar frequencies (“reputation of
program,” having an “academic medical center program,” as well as quality of the
residents, faculty, and educational curriculum).7
Second, in terms of applications, doctors apply to many more programs than
they rank. Some elimination of programs may be due to idiosyncratic preferences
on the part of doctors that get realized through the process. However, the main re-
duction in the number of ranked programs stems from hospitals choosing a subset
of the applicants for interviews, rather than applicants choosing not to interview
once given an invitation. In Figure 3 we use data reported in the NRMP’s 2018
program director survey to illustrate where selection is occurring. On the horizon-
tal axis we indicate the number of interviews invited by hospitals per application
made, while on the vertical axis we indicate the interviews attended by applicants
per invitation.
Averaging across the 23 medical specialties reported on, only one in every five
applications is extended an interview invitation, ranging from a 7.8 percent invi-
7Geographic location also has an arguably large common-value component.
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Figure 3: Selection of interviews
tation rate in dermatology to a 45.3 percent rate for vascular surgery. In contrast,
candidates on average attend four out of every five interviews offered, ranging
from a low of 70.4 percent attendance for pathology, to a high of 94.7 percent in
dermatology. As the median matched US senior (averaging across specialties) re-
ports applications to 46.6 programs but ranks just 12.9, extensive selection takes
place. The survey indicates that the majority of this selection appears to occur
through hospitals’ preferences.8
Finally, the NRMP’s reported match outcome data indicates that across the
years very similar proportions of matched US seniors and independent applicants
obtain their top-ranked outcome (see Figure 1). In general, US seniors tend to be
the more-desirable matches from hospitals’ point of view. This preference shows
up in the overall match rates where US seniors entering the NRMP are matched
at very high rates (∼95 percent) while independent applicants remain unmatched
approximately 40 percent of the time.9 However, if hospitals do have common
preferences, and rank US seniors as more desirable than independent applicants,
8In contrast, the median unmatched US senior applies to more programs (an average of 55.8
across specialties) but ranks only 7 programs on average. The majority of the reduction again
stems comes about through hospital selection over the interview invitations.
9This preference is also exhibited in the number of interviews extended to each type of appli-
cant.
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even if doctors preferences were fully idiosyncratic we would expect to see large
differences in the top-rank matching rate across the two groups.
Turning back to our DA simulation with 100 doctors and 100 hospitals, if we
set λH = 1 and λD = 0 we find that 50.6 percent of the simulated doctors match to
their first-ranked program. However, if we break the sample up into above- and
below-median doctors (using the hospital’s common ranking cd) the simulation
predicts starker results. For the above-median doctors our simulations suggest
75.8 percent are matched to their top-ranked program, while this figure is only
25.6 percent for the below median group. In contrast, while the data does suggest
substantial differences in the match rate for US seniors and independent appli-
cants, conditional on matching there are no substantial difference in the rate of
top-ranked outcomes.
In the next section, we outline our theoretical model for how the interviews af-
fect outcomes. After outlining our main theoretical results, we return to a number
of simulation exercises at the end of the paper.
3 The Model
Our model is a simple variant of the standard two-sided matching model, as de-
scribed in, for example, Roth and Sotomayor (1990). We introduce an initial in-
terview stage, which is captured through a many-to-many stability notion. After
interviews are conducted, agents’ preferences are “pruned,” or “truncated,” so as
to only rank interview partners. These preferences are then used in the standard
deferred acceptance (DA) algorithm that governs the NRMP match.
3.1 Basic Definitions
A market is a triple (H,D,U ) where:
• H is a finite set of hospitals;
• D is a finite set of doctors;
• U = ((ud)d∈D , (uh)h∈H ) is a profile of utility functions, with ud : H ∪ {d} → R
and uh :D ∪ {h} → R for each d and h.
A utility ua induces an ordinal preference a over the relevant set of alterna-
tives. We shall assume throughout that ua(b) = ua(b′) implies that b = b′, so that
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the resulting preferences a are strict. The rank of b in ua is 1 + the number of
b′ with ua(b′) > ua(b). In particular, agent a’s most preferred match partner is her
ranked-1 partner. An agent b is unacceptable for a if ua(a) > ua(b).
A matching is a function µ : H ∪D → H ∪D, with the properties that µ(h) ∈
D∪{h}, µ(d) ∈H∪{d}, and µ(d) = h if and only if µ(h) = d. A matching µ is stable for
a market (H,D,U ) if ua(µ(a)) ≥ ua(a) for all a ∈D ∪H , and there is no (d,h) ∈D ×H
with ud(h) > ud(µ(d)) and uh(d) > uh(µ(h)).
A many-to-many matching is a function µ : H ∪D → 2H∪D with the properties
that µ(d) ⊆ H , µ(h) ⊆ D, and h ∈ µ(d) if and only if d ∈ µ(h). When an agent a is
unassigned, we have that µ(a) = ∅. Given the pair of positive integers (k,k′), we say
that a many-to-many matching µ is pairwise stable for (k,k′) if
•
∣∣∣µ(d)∣∣∣ ≤ k and there is no h ∈ µ(d) with ud(h) < ud(d)
•
∣∣∣µ(h)∣∣∣ ≤ k′ and there is no d ∈ µ(h) with uh(d) < uh(h)
• There is no pair (h,d) such that d < µ(h) while h would want to add d, and
d would like to add h, to its list of partners in µ. Formally, there is no (h,d)
such that d < µ(h) and one of the following applies
1. ud(h) > ud(h′) and uh(d) > uh(d′) for some (h′,d′) ∈ µ(d)×µ(h); or
2. ud(h) > ud(h′) and uh(d) > uh(h) for some h′ ∈ µ(d) while
∣∣∣µ(h)∣∣∣ < k′; or
3. ud(h) > ud(d) and uh(d) > uh(d′) for some d′ ∈ µ(h); while
∣∣∣µ(d)∣∣∣ < k;
3.2 Interview Schedules
In our model, doctors and hospitals first schedule interviews and then participate
in the match.
An interview schedule is a many-to-many matching. Given a pair of integers
(k,k′), a (k,k′)-constrained interview schedule is a many-to-many matching µ with∣∣∣µ(d)∣∣∣ ≤ k and ∣∣∣µ(h)∣∣∣ ≤ k′ for all d and h. In words, each doctor is constrained to
interview with at most k hospitals; and each hospital is constrained to interview at
most k′ doctors.
Given an interview schedule µ, the agents’ interview-truncated preferences are
determined by setting ua(b) < ua(a) for all b < µ(a). That is, interview-truncated
preferences rank all interviewed agents the same as in the original preferences,
and sets all non-interviewed agents as unacceptable.
The timing in our model is then:
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1. An interview schedule is determined as the doctor-optimal may-to-many
(k,k′)-stable matching.
2. Doctors and hospitals participate in the match. They report interview-truncated
preferences, which are used as inputs in the doctor-proposing DA. The out-
come is the doctor-optimal stable matching in the market with interview-
truncated preferences.
A doctor-optimal interview schedule can be found algorithmically by the “T-
algorithm” (see Blair (1988), Fleiner (2003) and Echenique and Oviedo (2006)),
but we assume that it results from a decentralized process of interview schedul-
ing. One may imagine several reasons why an interview schedule might be unsta-
ble, but our focus is on the tension between a “pure” application of the DA, and
one that is preceded by interviews. As such, assuming a stable outcome at the
interview stage seems reasonable.10
The two steps, 1 and 2, in the above timeline are termed “TADA,” as the T -
algorithm is followed by Deferred Acceptance. We denote by µT the outcome of
TADA.
For comparison with µT , the doctor-proposing DA algorithm starting from agents’
original preferences, not the interview-truncated preferences, determines a match-
ing µDA.
4 Preliminaries: Interviews Need not Increase Rank-
ings
In general, interviews need not yield outcomes corresponding to higher-ranked
partners in submitted preferences. In this section, we describe a particularly sim-
ple counter-example, which will shed light on the conditions that ensure inter-
views increase reported rankings of partners (and used in our main theoretical
results).
10In one-to-one matching markets, experimental evidence suggests that decentralized interac-
tions in matching markets yield stable outcomes at high rates, see Echenique and Yariv (2013).
For more on the theory of many-to-many matchings, see also Sotomayor (1999) and Konishi and
Ünver (2006). Finally, by focusing on the doctor-optimal stable matching we are rigging the model
against our conclusion. A worse stable matching for doctors will result in an even larger difference
between the reported match ranks in TADA, and the corresponding ranks in the DA.
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Consider a matching market with three doctors, {d1,d2,d3}, and three hospi-
tals, {h1,h2,h3}. Hospitals’ preferences are common: they all prefer d1 to d2, d2 to
d3, and d3 to staying unmatched. Doctors’ preferences are described in the fol-
lowing table, where higher-ranked hospitals for each doctor appear higher in the
corresponding column.
d1 d2 d3
h1 h2 h1
h3 h3 h2
h2 h1 h3
d1 d2 d3
If we run the regular deferred acceptance algorithm (DA), or any stable mech-
anism, it is easy to see that di matches to hi , so the rank of di ’s match, hi , is i.
Suppose that the number of interviews is constrained by k = k′ = 2. Each doctor
would then interview with their top two choices. That is, the resulting interviews
are:
d1 : h1 and h3;
d2 : h2 and h3;
d3 : h1 and h2.
To complete the outcome of TADA, consider the post-interview DA procedure.
Given the interview truncated preferences, di matches with hi for i = 1,2. But h3
and d3 are unmatched. So the rank of d3’s match (being single) is four. Thus we
have made one doctor match to a worse outcome than if there were no interviews
at all.
In fact, with some disagreement between hospitals’ preferences, we can con-
struct examples that shift a doctor’s match rank from one in the DA without inter-
views to four in TADA, with the interview stage. For example, take agents’ pref-
erences as given in the following two tables, where, again, higher-ranked partners
appear higher in the corresponding column.
d1 d2 d3
h1 h2 h3
h2 h1 h1
h3 h3 h2
d1 d2 d3
h1 h2 h3
d2 d2 d3
d3 d1 d2
d1 d3 d1
h1 h2 h3
With these preferences, DA absent interviews again implies that di matches
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with hi . However, with a capacity of two interviews for each participant (k = k′ =
2) doctor d1 does not get to interview with h1. Consequently, d1 and h1 remain
unmatched and d1’s rank falls from one to four.
Note that in these examples there is substantial disagreement between doctors’
preferences. Indeed, there is not a single pairwise comparison of hospitals for
which the doctors agree. As we show in the subsequent section, some agreement
on the ranking of hospitals rules out such examples.
5 Theoretical Results
In the introduction and our discussion of the NRMP data, we emphasized the
role of a common component in doctors’ preferences. Our first theoretical result
(Proposition 1) confirms that, indeed, if doctors agree on how hospitals are ranked,
interviews improve observed match ranks in the succeeding clearinghouse.
The assumption of a common ranking seems strong, and unrealistic. Our sec-
ond result (Proposition 2) shows that the main force behind our first result kicks in
for a large market, as long as there is a common-value component, however small,
in agents preferences. Finally, and before we provide a battery of quantitative
findings through simulations, we illustrate convergence rates for the large-market
result (Proposition 3).
5.1 Aligned Preferences
Proposition 1. Suppose that k = k′ and that all doctors’ preferences are the same. Then
for any doctor d, the rank of µT (d) in her interview-truncated preference is always less
than or equal to the rank of µDA(d) in her actual preference d .
The result assumes k = k′, mainly for expository reasons. As we shall see below,
in our main result we allow for the two bounds to differ. In fact, the main result is
driven by k, not k′.
5.2 Large Markets
Proposition 1 relies on perfectly aligned preferences. Here we show that even a
small common-value component suffices to deliver our result, for a large market.
We provide a probabilistic statement, when agents’ utilities are randomly gener-
ated. An arbitrarily large fraction of doctors, with arbitrarily large probability,
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assign a higher rank to their match in the TADA assignment than their true rank-
ing of their DA match.
The model of Section 3 has to be modified to account for the size of the market,
and for randomly generated preferences. For each n, let (Dn,Hn,Un) be a mar-
ket where Dn = {d1, . . . ,dn}, Hn = {h1, . . . ,hn} and each utility function is randomly
drawn with a common value component, as well as an idiosyncratic value. Specif-
ically, suppose that
und (h) = λ
Dch + (1−λD)ηd,h
unh (d) = λ
Hcd + (1−λH )ηh,d
for all d ∈Dn and h ∈Hn, where λD ,λH ∈ (0,1). Suppose, moreover, that una (a) = 0.
Here, ch and cd are common-value components of agents’ utilities, while ηd,h
and ηh,d are idiosyncratic. The existence of a common-value component is cru-
cial to our results, but it does not need to be the dominant component of doctors
utilities. All we need is that λD ,λH > 0.
Suppose that each ch, cd , ηd,h and ηh,d is drawn from an absolutely continuous
distribution with support [0,1]. (This can be relaxed to any continuous distribu-
tion with compact support and strictly positive density.)
Let µDAn be the outcome of the doctor-proposing DA in the n-th market; such a
matching is random and depends on the realized utilities, but we omit writing it
explicitly as a function of (c,η).
The TADA procedure determines a matching µTn by choosing a (kn, k
′
n) con-
strained interview schedule µˆ as the doctor-optimal many-to-many stable match-
ing, as before, and running the doctor-proposing DA algorithm in the original
matching.
We state the next result somewhat informally.
Proposition 2. Suppose that limsupkn/n < 1 and let ε > 0 and θ > 0. The probability
of the following event converges to 1 as n→∞: For a fraction at least 1 − θ of doctors
d ∈ Dn, the rank of µTn (d) in d’s interview-truncated preference is less than the rank of
ud(µDAn (d))− ε in d’s actual preference d .
A formal statement of Proposition 2 can be found in Section 8.2, together with
a proof. The idea behind this proposition is simple. Consider the DA. By Sangmok
Lee’s results (Lee, 2016), an arbitrarily large fraction of doctors get arbitrarily close
to what their “assortative” match utility would be, based on their common-value
utilities. If kn is fixed, or does not grow faster than n, with high probability a large
fraction of doctors will have at least kn hospitals ranked above their common value
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utility (minus ε). Since the rank of a doctor’s matching in TADA is at most kn, the
result follows.
Finally, we provide convergence rates for the large-market result in Proposi-
tion 2. The rates are modest, implying (poly-)logarithmic or polynomial growth in
the relevant “approximation guarantees” θ and pi. Our result on convergence rates
is complementary to the simulation results in Section 6, which assume (arguably)
realistic market sizes.
Proposition 3. The statement in Proposition 2 holds for n =Ω((ln(1/pi))4) as pi→ 0,
and n = Ω((1/θ)4) as θ → 0. Specifically, there are constants N , K , K ′, K ′′ and K ′′′
that do not depend on θ and pi, such that for all
n ≥max{N¯ , ln(pi/4)
K
,
ln(4/pi)
2δ2
, (
θ
2
+K ′)−1, (12
θ
)4,
(
log(1− pi2 )
logK ′′ + 3
)4
K ′′′, }
the statement in Proposition 2 holds.
6 Quantitative Results for the NRMP
Our theoretical results raise two important questions. The first regards the size of
the market. Proposition 2 is asymptotic, so it is natural to ask whether interviews
matter for smaller, more-realistic, market sizes. The second question regards un-
matched agents. One might worry that interview-truncated preferences give rise
to large numbers of unmatched market participants. If interviews play the role
suggested by our theoretical results, we would want the number of unmatched
agents to roughly match the numbers observed in the NRMP.
We address these questions using numerical simulations. In the past year,
matched US seniors applied to 46.7 programs on average and got an average of
13.1 interviews.11 In our simulations, we consider small markets, with 50 doctors
and 50 positions. These are roughly within the range of the number of positions
in any particular specialty, and corresponding to the figures above. We assume an
11Unmatched US seniors applied to a somewhat higher number of programs, averaging at 55.8
and received an average of 7 interviews. Independent applicants applied to a higher number of
programs and receive fewer interviews. Matched independent applicants, on average, applied to
69.4 positions and received 8.7 interviews, while unmatched independent applicants applied to an
average of 70.1 programs and received 3.1 interviews.
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Table 1: Hospital rank and probability of being unmatched in simulated markets
(N = 50, k = 5)
Rank First Second Third Fourth Fifth + Unmatched
NRMP data (2019)
US seniors 47.1 15.3 10.1 6.5 15.2 5.8
Simulations
DA, No interviews 12.7 11.3 9.8 8.5 57.6 0
TADA with Reported 41.3 24.8 14.3 8.2 5 5.9
TADA with True 11.2 10.1 8.9 7.8 62 5.9
interview capacity of 5.12
In our simulations, we use normally distributed common and idiosyncratic
draws to derive the cardinal preferences ud(h) and uh(d), as discussed in Section 2,
where we apply a weight of λD = λH = 25 to the common component. Analysis of
different weights generates very similar results (see also our Table 2 below).13
Table 1 summarizes the data from the NRMP and the outcomes from our sim-
ulations. The first row simply reproduces the NRMP data for US seniors. In the
subsequent rows we report on the simulated outcomes under: (i) DA with no in-
terviews; (ii) TADA with ranks calculated according to the interview truncated
preference; and (iii) TADA with the ranks calculated with the true preference.
DA without interviews generates substantially fewer higher-ranked matches
than observed in the data. In contrast, when looking at the reported preferences
under TADA, the figures exhibit great resemblance to those of the NRMP. Our
theoretical results speak to the comparison between the DA ranks and the re-
ported TADA ranks in a large market. Here we see the same conclusion borne
out in a small market simulation. Focusing on reported preferences is crucial.
Indeed, while 41.3% of doctors are matched to their top-ranked program under
the reported preferences (compared to 47.1% in the data from the NRMP in 2019
12For the source of the data reported in this section, see the applicant (2019) and program direc-
tor (2018) surveys and the annual Results and Data reports for the Main Residency Match on the
NRMP website: http://www.nrmp.org/main-residency-match-data/
13All reported figures are average outcomes across the 50 doctors, further averaged across 2,500
simulations, each with a new set of draws of 〈ch, cd ,ηd,h,ηd,h〉.
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Figure 4: Fraction matched to first-ranked hospital (N=1,700)
Match), only 11.2% are matched to their top-ranked program in terms of their
underlying preferences.
In terms of likelihood of matching, since our preference specification makes all
doctors and hospitals acceptable to one another, DA produces a complete matching
in the market. Interviews naturally come at a cost of unmatched agents. Nonethe-
less, our simulations suggest a small fraction of unmatched individuals, and com-
parable to what is observed in the NRMP data.
The simulations in Table 1 assume a market size of 50, which, despite our large-
market theoretical results, might raise questions about the validity of the conclu-
sions in larger markets. To this end, we ran simulations on a medium-sized market
of N = 1,700 doctors and hospitals.14 The results are in line with our theoretical
results and simulations for small markets. For computational reasons, we were not
able to implement TADA for large markets. Instead, we had interviews scheduled
exclusively along the common-value components of agents’ preferences. Effec-
14While the 2019 NRMP had approximately 34,000 positions listed, much of the match breaks
down into specialty sub-markets. For the listed specialties in the 2019 NRMP outcome report
(Table 13), the median sub-market has 484 positions, ranging in size from 21 positions for Pedi-
atrics/Medical Genetics (the NRMP only provide data for specialties with more than 20 total posi-
tions) to 8,512 for Internal Medicine. The 20th and 80th percentiles across the listed sub-markets
have 37 and 1,740 positions listed, which are approximated by our chosen simulation sizes of 50
and 1,700.
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Table 2: Difference between reported and true ranks: medium-market
simulations (N = 1700, k = 10).
Rank difference First Second Third Fourth Unmatched
λD = λH = 0.2 12.3 7.4 3.9 2.2 2.5
λD = λH = 0.3 18.6 11.6 6.5 3.7 2.5
λD = λH = 0.4 24.7 15.6 10.2 6.2 2.7
λD = λH = 0.5 28.5 19.1 12.2 7.3 2.7
λD = λH = 0.6 29.6 20.5 13.9 9.1 2.6
tively, then, interviews follow a version of a serial dictatorship.15
Figure 4 and Table 2 indicate the results from these larger market simulations.
First, in Figure 4 we indicate the fraction of top-ranked outcomes measure ac-
cording to the actual rankings (the gray lines) and the interview-truncated rank-
ings (the black lines). We report the results across differing weights placed on the
common-value component on the horizontal axis (varying λD = λH from 0.2 to 0.6
in one-tenth increments) and for the number of interview slots (k = 10 and k = 20).
The figure indicates the growing difference the between the true and stated top-
rank outcomes as the common-value component becomes more important.
In Table 2 we focus on the simulations with k = 10 interviews. The table re-
ports, for each rank, the difference between the percentage of doctors who report
that rank in the interview-truncated match and the percentage of doctors who fall
into that rank according to their true simulated preference. So for the First col-
umn, the table simply reports the distance between the black and gray k = 10 lines
in Figure 4. The Second through Fourth columns report the differences for the other
top-ranked positions. Finally, the last column in Table 2 reports the percentage of
unmatched doctors.16
Overall, the conclusions from the larger markers are in line with our obser-
vations from the small-market simulations. Interviews substantially increase the
15As a verification that this change in procedure does not distort the outcomes much, we com-
pared this simplified version of TAGS to the full computation in smaller markets where computa-
tional impediments are not present. Results across the two algorithms are very similar when N is
small.
16We have conducted larger simulations still with N = 2,500 and k = 20. The results obtained
are similar to those reported for N = 1,700.
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likelihood of a match with a highly ranked partner according to the doctors’ re-
ported preferences. Furthermore, as can be seen in Figure 4, our results remove
sensitivity to the precise weight put on the common component. Naturally, how-
ever, as less weight is put on the common component, the interview process has a
weaker impact. Similarly, the larger the interview cap k the smaller the effects.
7 Conclusions
Much of the matching literature has focused on the centralized clearinghouse gov-
erning the match of newly-minted doctors and residency positions. In this paper,
we illustrate the possibility that decentralized interactions preceding the match—
namely, interviews—may dramatically impact ultimate outcomes.
Using NRMP data we suggest a puzzle for the standard model without inter-
views: too many doctors match to their stated top-ranked hospitals. Ostensibly, this
might indicate the clearinghouse’s algorithm is doing its job. If doctors’ prefer-
ences over hospitals are idiosyncratic, such patterns are to be expected. However,
idiosyncratic preferences are difficult to reconcile with surveys of NRMP partici-
pants, as well as common intuitions suggesting an important common-value com-
ponent in preferences, due to public rankings of hospitals, shared quality of life
considerations, etc. Our paper illustrates that the decentralized interview phase
preceding the match may explain the puzzle.
For the NRMP, our results imply that empirical estimations based on prefer-
ences submitted to the centralized clearinghouse should be used with great cau-
tion. Stated rankings can reveal information on the relative preferences over ranked
programs. However, the application and interview process may naturally truncate
the stated preferences to a far smaller set of options. As such, a great deal of infor-
mation on the complete preference is lost within the process.
More broadly, and beyond the application to the NRMP, our paper suggests
that interactions outside of a matching clearinghouse can have dramatic effects
on centralized outcomes. In particular, the analysis of matching clearinghouses
cannot be reliably performed in isolation from other decentralized features of the
market.
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8 Proofs
8.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Let  be the common preference that doctors have over hospitals. Note that the
DA is the same as serial dictatorship (SD) with the order dictated by hospital rank
in .
Consider a doctor d, assigned to h = µDA(d) in the rth round of SD. The rank of
h in d’s preference is therefore r. If k ≤ r then we are done, as the rank of µT (d) in
d’s truncated preference can be at most k.
So suppose that r < k. Then two observations follow. Consider the interview
stage and a hospital h = µDA(d) matched to d in stage r ′ < k of the DA. When
choosing whom to interview, h can choose any doctor, as all of them would have
received strictly fewer than k interview requests at the time they get a request from
h. So the hospital choosing at stage r ′ of the DA will interview the highest k doctors
in her preference.
The second observation is that µDA(h) = µT (h) for the hospital h choosing at
round r.17 This can be shown by induction: The statement is obviously true for the
highest ranked hospital. Suppose that µDA(h) = µT (h) for all the hospitals choosing
at any stage r ′ < r. If h is the hospital of rank r then the set of doctors available to
h in the DA stage of TADA is D, by our first observation, minus the choices of the
hospitals with rank r ′ < r. By the inductive hypothesis the doctors chosen by the
hospitals with rank r ′ < r is the same as in the DA. So the set of available doctors
to hospital h is the same in TADA as in the DA. Thus µDA(h) = µT (h).
8.2 Proof of Proposition 2
We start by providing a formal statement of Proposition 2.
Proposition. Let kn ≥ 1 be a sequence of positive integers. Let ε,θ,pi ∈ (0,1). Suppose
that limsupkn/n < 1. Then there is N ∈ N such that for all n ≥ N P (En) ≥ 1 − pi,
where En is the set of ch, cd , ηd,h and ηh,d such that in the resulting market (Dn,Hn,Un),
for a fraction at least 1 − θ of doctors d, the rank of µTn (d) in her interview-truncated
preference is less than the rank of u−1d (·)(ud(µDAn (d))− ε) in her actual preference d .
17Incidentally this may not happen for hospitals choosing at round r ′ > k. It is easy to come up
with examples.
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In well-intentioned notational abuse, we write cd for λDcd , ηd,h for (1−λD)ηd,h,
etc. So that the utilities are the sum of the common and private value components:
und (h) = ch + ηd,h, and u
n
h (d) = cd + ηh,d . The relevant probability distributions are
rescaled correspondingly, but remain absolutely continuous, with support on a
compact interval in R. Without loss we assume that this interval is [0,1].
Let D = ∪nDn, H = ∪nHn. Consider tuples (c,η), with c = (ca)a∈H∪D and
η = ((ηa,b)(a,b)∈H×D , (ηa,b)(a,b)∈D×H ).
The tuples (c,d) are endowed with the product probability measure from the iid
distributions described above. Any probabilistic statement refers to this probabil-
ity space.
Let G denote the cdf of the distribution from which cd is drawn and fix θ,ε,pi >
0.
To understand how the proof works, note that if agents match assortatively
then a doctor d should be able to find a hospital h for which it has idiosyncratic
utility close to 1, and this hospital should provide d with (approximately) the same
utility cd + 1 as it receives from matching with d. Think of cd + 1 as d’s “target
utility.”
To this end, let
An(ε, (c,η)) = {d ∈Dn : cd + 1− ε < ud(µDAn (d)) < cd + 1 + ε}
be the set of doctors for which this is achieved (in the DA), up to an ε. We shall
prove that, when n is large enough, with large probability a fraction at least 1−θ/2
doctors are in An(ε, (c,η)).
Next, we consider how many hospitals are ranked above a doctor’s target utility
cd + 1. Let
B(cd ,n) = {
∣∣∣h ∈Hn : ch + ηd,h > cd + 1∣∣∣ ≤ kn}.
be the event that fewer than kn hospitals give d a utility greater than d’s target
utility. We denote by βn the probability that a fraction of at least θ/2 doctors have
a “small” number (at most kn) of hospitals above their target utility.
Now, we shall prove below that, for n large enough, βn < pi/2 and P
(
1
n
∣∣∣An(ε, (c,η))∣∣∣ ≥ 1−θ/2) >
1−pi/2. Thus, the event that B(cd ,n) is false for a fraction≥ 1−θ/2 of doctors and the
event
(
1
n |An(ε, (c,ε))| ≥ 1−θ/2
)
holds, has probability≥ (1−pi/2)+(1−pi/2)−1 = 1−pi.
At the intersection of these events, it holds for a fraction ≥ (1−θ/2)+(1−θ/2)−1 =
1 − θ of d ∈ Dn that B(cd ,n) is false and d ∈ An(ε). Hence, for a fraction ≥ 1 − θ
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of d ∈ Dn there are more than kn hospitals above their target utility, and they are
within ε of their target utilities. This is the statement of the proposition and we
are done.
To finish the proof we carry out the calculations needed in the above paragraph.
To this end, let
l = limsup
n→∞
kn
n
and recall that l ∈ [0,1) by hypothesis. Choose c∗ and δ > 0 such that 1−G(c∗) + δ <
θ/4 and l < P (ch + ηd,h > c∗ + 1). This is possible by absolute continuity of the
distributions of ch and ηd,h. Let p(c∗) = P (ch + ηd,h > c∗ + 1).
Note that, if cd ≤ c∗ then
P (B(cd ,n)) = P (
∑
h∈Hn
1ch+ηd,h>cd+1 ≤ kn)
≤ P
1n ∑
h∈Hn
1ch+ηd,h>c∗+1 ≤ p(c∗)− (p(c∗)−
kn
n
)

≤ exp(−2(p(c∗)− kn
n
)2n) (1)
by Hoeffding’s inequality (observe that, eventually, p(c∗)− knn > 0).
Let
βn = P (|{d ∈Dn : B(cd ,n)}| > nθ/2)
≤ P
|{d ∈Dn : B(d,n) and cd ≤ c∗}|︸                                ︷︷                                ︸
Zn
+ |{d ∈Dn : cd > c∗}|︸               ︷︷               ︸
Yn
> nθ/2

≤ P (1
n
Zn + 1−G(c∗) + δ > θ/2) + P (1nYn > 1−G(c
∗) + δ)
The first inequality follows by counting all d with cd > c∗ as if B(d,n) were true. So
the random variable Yn counts all d ∈Dn with cd > c∗ as if they were in B(cd ,n).
The second inequality is a truncation exercise, partitioning the probability
space into two events. The first event is 1nYn ≤ 1−G(c∗) + δ and the second is 1nYn >
1−G(c∗) + δ. Under the second event, we automatically have that 1nZn + 1nYn > θ/2
as 1−G(c∗) + δ > θ/2. Under the first event, the inequality is obtained by “raising”
1
nYn to 1−G(c∗) + δ.
Applying Hoeffding’s inequality again,
P (
1
n
Yn > 1−G(c∗) + δ) ≤ exp(−2δ2n). (2)
21
Now,
P (Zn > n(θ/2− [1−G(c∗) + δ)]) ≤ P (∪d∈DnB(d,n))|cd = c∗)
≤
∑
d∈Dn
P (B(d,n)|cd = c∗)
≤ nexp(−2(p(c∗)− kn
n
)2n), (3)
where the first inequality follows as n(θ/2− (1−G(c∗) +δ)) ≥ 1, and the probability
of B(d,n) is maximized by setting cd = c∗.
Choose n such that
n(θ/2− [1−G(c∗) + δ]) > 1, (4)
exp(−2δ2n) < pi/4, (5)
nexp(−2(p(c∗)− kn
n
)2n) < pi/4, (6)
and P
(1
n
∣∣∣An(ε, (c,η))∣∣∣ ≥ 1−θ/2) > 1−pi/2. (7)
Observe that (4) is possible as θ/2−[1−G(c∗)+δ] > 0. Inequality (6) requires that k is
O(n), which holds by hypothesis, and our choice of c∗ to ensure that p(c∗)−kn/n > 0
is eventually bounded below. Inequality (7) is possible by Theorem 1 of Lee (2016).
By (3) and (2) (5) and (6), we obtain that
βn ≤ nexp(−2(p(c∗)− kn )
2n) + exp(−2δ2n) < pi/2 (8)
Statements (7) and (8) provide the two bounds needed to complete the proof.
8.3 Proof of Proposition 3
The market size in the proof of Proposition 2 is determined from inequalities (4)-
(7). These are the starting point of the proof. Using the bounds in Lee (2016), these
mean that we need to choose n such that
−2[p(c∗)− kn
n
]2n ≤ ln( pi
4n
) (9)
−2δ2n < ln(pi
4
), (10)
1
θ
2 − (1−G(c∗) + δ)
< n (11)
2
n
( 1
n1/4
− 3
)√
n log(n) +
6
n1/4
>
θ
2
(12)
(1− gn)2n1/4−4 ≥ 1− pi2 , (13)
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where gn is o(e−
√
n logn)
For (9), choose N0 and K0 such that if n ≥ N0 then (p(c∗) − kn/n)2 ≤ K0. This is
possible given the hypothesis that limsupkn/n < 1. Next, let N1 ≥ N0 and K1 be
such that, for all n ≥N1, 2K0n− lnn ≥ K1n. Then we need that
K2n ≥ ln( 4pi ) (14)
For (10) and (11), we have
n >
ln(4/pi)
2δ2
(15)
n ≥ 1
θ
2 − (1−G(c∗))− δ
(16)
For (12) we need that
2
√
n logn
n5/4
− 6
√
n logn
n
+
6
n1/4
<
θ
2
⇐⇒ 2logn
n1/4
(
1√
n
− 3
n1/4
)
+
6
n1/4
<
θ
2
Let N2 ≥ N1 be such that for all n ≥ N2, 1√n − 3n1/4 ≤ 0. Then all we need is that
6
n1/4
< θ2 , or that
n ≥ (12
θ
)4. (17)
For (13), fix N3 ≥ N2 and K4 such that for all n ≥ N3 1− gn ≥ K4. So we need to
obtain log(1− pi2 )) ≤ (2n1/4 − 3)logK3. That is,
n ≥
(
log(1− pi2 )
logK3
+ 3
)4 1
16
(18)
Set N¯ = N3, K = K2 K ′ = (1 −G(c∗)) + δ, K ′′ = K ′′′ = 1/16. Then the calculations
above correspond to (14), (15), (16), (17), and (18).
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